This paper provides an approach to new firm growth that views this as an unfolding developmental process. This approach is based on a Penrosean (1995) model of the firm. We find that new firm growth is non-linear and prone to interruptions and setbacks to an extent overlooked in the literature. From the model of development used, five propositions are drawn concerning measurable features of new firms' growth paths; these relate to patterns of survival, continuousness of growth, turning points, reversals and cumulative growth. These propositions are examined in the light of data on the growth paths of new firms in three countries, with aggregate comparisons of firms' growth paths effected by graphical representations and sequence analysis.
Introduction
The study of new firm growth suffers from an absence of conceptual models that can link research at different levels of analysis so that consistent inferences can be drawn from one level to another. Evidence from case studies of new firms provides narratives of individual development, while aggregate analysis examines rates and trends in performance, but aggregate and individual analysis are not used to inform each other in the current literature. Improvement could be made by comparing consistent measures of firms' performance and the way these change over the course of firms' existence. To ensure measures are appropriate and connect empirical work at case study and aggregate levels on new firm growth, conceptual grounding is required. In this paper we propose an account of new firm growth built on the work of Penrose (1995) and explore available data on the growth paths of new firms from three samples. We find that the growth of these firms is non-linear and prone to interruptions and setbacks to an extent overlooked in the literature. However, this accords with what a Penrosean theory of firm growth would lead us to expect. We show this by drawing measurable propositions from the Penrosean conceptual framework which are then examined in the light of empirical data on the growth paths of new firms in three countries. This work involves experimental methods which require further refinement. If new firms play the part in economic renewal currently attributed to them (cf. Audretsch and Thurik, 2001) , the study of their growth needs a sound conceptual base at the firm level and calls for new longitudinal methods.
New Firm Growth Studies
Two types of studies have dominated research on new firm growth up till now: studies of factors associated with growth and case-oriented studies of stages of growth. Factors of growth studies have been dominated by the analysis of variance using cross-sectional measures to compare the attributes or conditions of new firms in samples and populations. Attributes of firms with a successful growth record have been found in a number of studies to include factors such as ambitious founders, a founding team rather than solo entrepreneur, education and relevant experience among founders, willingness to share equity, a multi-skilled management team, marketing expertise (Utterback et al., 1988; Barkham et al., 1996; Storey, 1997a; Wiklund, 1998; Almus and Nerlinger, 1999; Cosh and Hughes, 2000) . Indicators of this kind provide a guide to desirable attributes of new firms.
However, inferences from the founding attributes of successful firms have been questioned. Critics point out that as much as 80 per cent of sample variance is left unexplained in some of these studies (Woo et al., 1994: 507; Curran and Blackburn, 2001: 44) . Adherents have granted that prediction of performance based on start-up attributes is weak, but hope that ''once the business is in operation, forecasting improves somewhat'' (Storey, 1997a: 159) .
Integrating findings from factors of growth studies has proved a challenge. Different samples and timeframes have come up with contradictory or inconclusive results. For example, Storey found in his useful review that: ''Five studies do not identify an impact, three indicate that prior sectoral experience is associated with slower-growing firms, and one suggests that prior sector experience is associated with faster-growing firms'' (Storey, 1997a: 135) . Some research suggests that long experience of the industry by founders may inhibit innovative performance (Storey, 1997a) while other findings indicate that prior knowledge of an industry enhances firm performance (Oakey, 1995; Shane, 2000) . Storey reported that growth firms tend to have older than average founders (1997a: 158) while Barkham et al. (1996: 62) found younger owner-managers had faster growing firms. Some studies find merit in a deliberate niche market strategy, exploiting a quality or technological advantage (Storey, 1997a: 142-143) . Others find that niche strategies may trap the firm (Aldrich, 1999) . Many studies found a positive correlation between product innovation and small firm growth (see Storey, 1997a) , while Freel and Robson (2004) found a negative relationship between product innovation and growth in sales. Since many of the sample survey studies have low response rates and compare firms that differ in their age, industry and business cycle timing, these inconsistencies are not surprising.
Greater consistency could be provided in factors of growth studies by studying cohorts of comparable new firms over the same time period. This would address the charge that factors of growth studies have drawn inappropriate inferences from survivors in samples by excluding less successful firms. The problem of survivor bias has long been recognized but is often disregarded (Keasey and Watson, 1993; Penrose, 1995: 7) . Moreover, unless factors and attributes held to cause success are clearly differentiated from the effects of success, studies of this kind are open to the charge of circular reasoning (Porter, 1991: 108-109) .
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No less criticism has been directed at generalizations about growth based on studies at the firm level. Case study evidence is not acceptable to many journals and has been dismissed as unscientific (Kerlinger, 1986) . Stage theories of growth based on case evidence have been held to be unproven and non-predictive (Storey, 1997a: 122) . Excessive claims for invariance in stage of growth theories have led scholars to reject the idea of any ''recurring temporal sequence'' in the development of the new firm (Bhidé , 2000: 247) . The merit in growth stage studies stems from the benefits of observation at the firm level and of identifying dynamic connections between stages (e.g. Greiner, 1972) .
2 But in many stages of growth studies unrelated concepts and over-specified phase timings reflect observations from a particular context. There is no basis for conceptual and empirical alignment between stage models and they confuse developmental processes and phases of activity (Greiner, 1972; Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1989; Churchill, 1997) . Certain developmental processes are common in new firms: to operate in a capitalist economy, they must mobilize resources to form a resource base capable of generating market returns. Companies that face and solve similar developmental problems in sequence will go through similar phases of activity; firms that require an in-house production facility, for example, have to build this before they can organize productive activity (Garnsey, 1998) . The building of different kinds of resource base involves different kinds of activity. It may be necessary to lay down infrastructure before facilities can be used, or, at the other extreme, resources may be rapidly mobilized to create a base for consultancy using current knowledge. Problems may be addressed in parallel, or may recur. Firm founders may or may not inherit a resource base from another organization through spin-out (Klepper, 2001 ). There are no invariant phases of activity in new firm development because different problems arise in different kinds of ventures and are addressed in different ways. Nevertheless, stage approaches do have the merit of making observations of firm's internal dynamics. Without observations at the firm level, the mechanisms and processes of growth remain obscure, however sophisticated the regressions and crosssectional analysis of variance used (Mohr, 1982) . Measures of attributes drawn even from comparable firms cannot reveal the underlying mechanisms and processes that give rise to new firm growth. Argenti articulated the problem in connection with firm failure: … a mere list of causes and symptoms, no matter how coherent and comprehensive it may be, is not enough. What is missing from such an inventory-and indeed from all previous work in this field-is the dynamics … the sequencing of events … (Argenti, 1976: 121) Moreover, it is essential to have related explanatory concepts to guide inquiry and make sense of evidence. A mass of undigested empirical findings can be misleading. For example, evidence that outstanding growth occurs among only a few firms has been used as a rationale for investing in fast growth firms. Databases are created to identify such firms, but by excluding firms from fast track databases as soon as their performance falters, the very evidence required to understand the experience of fast growth in a firm's development is eliminated.
In brief, the study of new firm growth suffers from an absence of conceptual models that can filter and assimilate diachronic evidence (on change over time) at the firm level and interpret this in terms of a shared discourse. Conceptual models are needed to build on prior work and make connections between related fields of study, for example, management, strategy, entrepreneurship, innovation and network studies.
A Dynamic Process Approach
Attribute and growth stage studies of new firms using rigorous methodologies have an important contribution to make. This paper does not attempt to remedy existing approaches, but illustrates an alternative approach to exploring growth in new firms, theoretically grounded in the work of Penrose.
Penrose found a middle way between description and unsubstantiated generalization in her book on the growth of the firm (1995; cf. Best and Garnsey, 1999; Kor and Mahoney, 2000; Pitelis, 2002) . She identified dynamic processes by inference from detailed observation, drawing together her inferences to build an account of the interconnected causes of growth in established manufacturing firms. Penrose did not write about new firms, but dynamic processes operate in new firms as they do in established firms, and shape early growth experience, but with distinctive effects that reflect the liabilities of newness (Hugo and Garnsey, 2005) . Penrose (1995) saw growth as a cumulative process in which the members of a firm build knowledge and competence. Firm growth is ''[…] a result of a process of development […] in which an interacting series of internal changes leads to increases in size accompanied by changes in the characteristics of the growing object'' (Penrose, 1995: 1) . Penrose derived her evidence from detailed study of the history of particular firms, but was able to provide an analysis going beyond the firm-specific context. She retained her focus on internal processes of change while emphasizing the importance of the firm's positioning in its industrial environment. Entrepreneurship is a key ingredient of her theory since entrepreneurial judgement is needed to recognize market opportunities. Firm growth is driven by a ''productive opportunity'' (Penrose, 1995) in a cumulative process of interaction between the firm's productive base and market opportunities.
Process-based analysis of the kind we have in mind engages in reasoning about interconnected causes of change and growth, and attempts to identify mechanisms and drivers of change in relation to timing and sequence (cf. McKelvey, 2004) . This usage is close to Van de Ven and Poole's (1995) use of process theories as theories that explain how and why change unfolds in organizations. Mohr (1982) argued that process theories embody a flow of action in which the time ordering of events is of critical importance. In contrast ''… in a variance theory the ordering of two direct causes, X 1 and X 2 , is immaterial in the sense that each has an independent effect on Y with the other held constant'' (Mohr, 1982: 60) . Many studies that attempt to account for variance do not inquire into the influence of timing and sequencing on causal processes.
The importance of timing is conveyed in Penrose's dictum that ''history matters'' in the growth of the firm. Although useful attempts have recently been made to apply resourcebased theory to new firms (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001; Brush et al., 2001; Lichtenstein and Brush, 2001) , the potential of Penrose's original dynamic process approach to take into account feedback effects remains to be explored. In the next section we draw inferences from Penrose's work (1995) pointing to non-linearities in new firms' growth paths.
Dynamic Processes Affecting New Firms' Growth Paths
We view the entrepreneurial process as comprising the pursuit of opportunity and the mobilization of resources to create, deliver and capture value through business activity. For Penrose, entrepreneurs seek to realize a ''productive opportunity'' which comprises ''all of the productive possibilities that its 'entrepreneurs' see and can take advantage of'' (Penrose, 1995: 31) . Opportunities are objectively identifiable but their recognition is subjective and requires exploratory activity either before or after the formal foundation of the new firm. To realize the opportunity it is necessary to organize business activity, which calls for some kind of resource base. The new firm may aim at a productive base that is very simple, as in the case of a research services company, or very complex, as in the case of a plant or other installation. Penrose (1995) was dealing with mature firms that already had a base of this kind. The new firm, in contrast, rarely starts out with a productive base, except in special cases such as demerger or endowed spin-out, but has to build one from the resources the entrepreneurs mobilize. Penrose stressed the way entrepreneurial managers match up opportunities and resources: ''The continual change in the productive services and knowledge within a firm along with the continual change in external circumstances present the firm with a continually changing productive opportunity'' (Penrose, 1995: 150) . As it grows, the firm's resources may come to support a variety of productive bases, but Penrose pointed out that: ''[…] movement into a new base requires a firm to achieve competence in some significantly different area of technology '' (1995: 110) .
Empirical data on firm growth, whether at the case study or aggregate level, will reveal diversity in the speed with which opportunity recognition can be translated into a functioning resource base. We can expect diversity in the onset of growth in terms of both inputs and outputs.
Liabilities of Newness 3
Penrose explored the dynamic processes taking place in established firms that achieved sustained growth. She identified the key to sustained growth as the ability to build a resource base and adapt this base to respond to new opportunities as these arose. Because markets and opportunities undergo change, she argued that there could be no state of rest in the firm. New firms must mobilize resources for and generate returns from the ''particular productive activities […] chosen from among the alternatives suitable to the abilities, finance and preferences of the entrepreneur'' (Penrose, 1995: 82) . But in practice, abilities and preferences may not include responsiveness to new opportunities. Indeed most small firms are run by people with modest expectations and limited access to resources who fail to recognize or pursue new opportunities (cf. Davidsson, 1989) .
It follows that if the new firm is started by entrepreneurs who settle for low or no growth, its sales and inputs are threatened as soon as the conditions in which it operates change. Cash constraints are a likely outcome of low or no growth in revenues. New firms are at risk before they have been able to build the resource base. 4 In contrast, more established firms are more likely to have ''organizational slack'' (cf. Cyert and March, 1963 ) that acts as a buffer to deal with growth interruptions and for the exploitation of new opportunities. Unless they can finance the building of a resource base themselves, new firms that run out of cash have to turn to the financial system, which imposes criteria they may be unable to meet. New firms often close before they have built a sustainable resource base. This leads us to our first proposition:
Proposition 1. New firms that do not grow are more likely to close.
Dynamic Instability
If failure to grow makes firms vulnerable, those that do grow are continually challenged by the demands of coordinating growth. Both growth inducing and growth limiting factors create coordination problems. Penrose explicitly rejected equilibrium theories of the firm (cf. Foss, 1997: 363) . She pointed out that:
The attainment of such a ''state of rest'' is precluded by three significant obstacles: those arising from the familiar difficulties posed by the indivisibility of resources; those arising from the fact that the same resources can be used differently under different circumstances, and in particular, in a ''specialized'' manner; and those arising because in the ordinary processes of operation and expansion new productive services are continuously being created. (Penrose, 1995: 68) In some cases, asynchronies of this kind can actually stimulate growth by spurring action to remedy deficits or surpluses-either by building new resources internally or by obtaining complementary resources externally. Obtaining or creating complementary resources are solutions that enlarge the firm's knowledge base, from which new opportunities can be pursued (Penrose, 1995: 54) . The learning process that new firms go through may result in non-linear and discontinuous growth paths in which, for example, spurts of growth are followed by periods of assimilation or stagnation. Dynamic processes continually alter the resource mix. Underutilized resources are an unacceptable opportunity cost for entrepreneurial managers intent on the pursuit of growth. Those who find ways to exploit under-used resources to realize new opportunities are more likely to sustain growth (cf. Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003) . But, once growth prospects are actively pursued, asynchronies arise again, possibly giving rise to the perverse effects of growth. According to Penrose, growing firms tend to experience a critical resource deficit in the capacity of decision makers to deal with the demands of growth. Managers with inside knowledge, experience and authority cannot be recruited in the market (Penrose, 1995: 45) . Other kinds of resource deficit are common and have to be dealt with by acquiring external or building internal resources.
5 This occurs sequentially as growth exerts uneven pressures on resources and hence on requirements for matching resources to remedy deficits or complement surpluses. If firms do not create or acquire the complementary resources required, their growth will be inhibited and a period of ''stagnation'' may follow (Penrose, 1995: 47) . This applies not only to those faced with capacity shortages, but also to those who allow some of the resources they have to remain unused. They are failing to exploit a key growth mechanism, the building of complementary resources. The mismatch between available resources and required resources ''limits the amount of expansion that can be undertaken at any given time …'' (Penrose, 1955: 532) . If we apply these insights to the case of the rapidly growing new firm, we can foresee perverse effects of early growth. The growing firm must draw in new resources to support growth, but it faces planning delays and coordination problems because it is impossible to synchronize resources to requirements precisely in a dynamic system. The need for internal coordination sets a brake on the rate at which market opportunities can be pursued (Penrose, 1995: 44-54) .
Early growth may have dangerous consequences in new firms still lacking reserves. The rate at which new resources are effectively mobilized may be insufficient to keep up with the pressures of growth on resources. Growth may consequently stall and bottlenecks can move growth into reverse. Penrose was concerned with firms of the kind that had built up sufficient reserves to carry them through short-term crises, and did not examine situations of this kind. But if we apply her dynamic analysis to the new firm that has achieved early growth but still has an immature resource base, we see that crises are a likely outcome of uncontrolled early growth. This effect can tip previously growing firms out of the growth league and into the faltering or declining categories. 6 The dynamic instability of new growing firms is represented in Proposition 2 and specified in Propositions 2a and 2b:
5 Penrose (1960) examined this in the case study of Hercules Powder, the Dupont demerger whose unused resources opened new opportunities, which however required further complementary resources to overcome resource deficits. 6 Putting them at risk of being taken over on unfavourable terms (as a solution to their ''growth-problems''). 
Economies of Growth
The relatively few firms that overcome the difficulties inhibiting early growth are those that experience growth-reinforcing processes. Expanding firms of this kind-sufficiently well resourced to take over competitors and complementary firms-are likely to become major employers. A firm's expanding resource base allows it to respond to changes in opportunity structure without succumbing to resource shortages, but as Penrose emphasized, it is necessary to perceive and act on the need for such reorientation. Penrose was interested primarily in endogenous growth.
7 But she also emphasized the need for the firm to be continually adjusting its activities to the shift in opportunities consequent on changes in technology and markets. This ability to respond to a new market is also key in current debates on dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) . Penrose identified prospects for new firms to grow in interstices, with expanding opportunities in new growth industries (cf. Hugo and Garnsey, 2002) . There is great interest at the present time in fast growth firms that become major employers. These are often contemporary versions of Penrose's successful entrepreneurial firm that can embark on a process of resource accumulation (Ghoshal et al., 2000 (Ghoshal et al., , 2002 further enhancing their market position: ''past success is a powerful aid to future progress'' (Penrose, 1995: 205) . This phenomenon of autocorrelated growth was early recognized by Ijiri and Simon (1967) and is recently formalized by Botazzi and Secchi (2003) who consider this to be a self-reinforcing or ''positive feedback'' effect (cf. Arthur, 1994; Antonelli, 1997) in a process whereby the probability of a given firm being able to exploit new opportunities depends on the number of opportunities already captured. They regard economies of scale, economies of scope, network externalities and knowledge accumulation as possible underlying economic mechanisms that explain this process (Botazzi and Secchi, 2003: 417) , while Chandler (1990) regards the interaction between economies of scale and economies of scope as the basic engine of economies of growth. Economies of growth may be important in explaining growth paths of (young) firms, hence:
Proposition 3. Growth is conducive to further growth.
Dynamic Processes and Growth Indicators
In this paper, our aim is to use the Penrosean model outlined above to connect mechanisms of growth at the level of the individual firm to evidence on growth among populations of firms. The dynamic processes Penrose analysed are not directly measurable by growth indicators. Rich case data are required to identify and explore the way they operate (cf. Hugo and Garnsey, 2005) . However, growth metrics can be used to invalidate or support our inferences from Penrose on the development of new firms. For example, if there are few signs of unsteady growth, interrupted growth, or growth surges and reversals, our argument that asynchronies are endemic in new firms and result in performance fluctuations would be in question. We present evidence in support of these non-linearities of growth among new firms.
The following section explores new ways of identifying and comparing diachronic features of new firms' growth that are obscured by the standard synchronic measures. Cross-sectional attributes cannot capture the growth paths of new firms or represent the surges, interruptions and reversals which are to be expected from the operation of dynamic processes. This paper is an exercise in theory building, not theory testing. We are not carrying out variance analysis to compare the growth rates and performance of new firms, nor formally testing associations among episodes of experience. The study aimed to draw quantifiable propositions from the Penrosean explanatory model and to see if these are consistent with aggregate data on new firm growth. This required collecting data of a specific kind and using new methods to represent evidence on the growth paths of new firms.
Developing Methods to Explore New Firm Growth Paths
Non-linear phenomena are usually modelled as if they were linear in order to make them more tractable. Aggregate behaviour is analysed as though produced by individual entities which all exhibit average behaviour (cf. Anderson et al., 1999) . But standard cross-sectional measures and average growth rates fail to capture important features of the course of growth in firms.
8 Recent reflections on the fields of new firms and entrepreneurship research have concluded that there is an explicit need for longitudinal research on firm growth (Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000; Chandler and Lyon, 2001 ). Little evidence is available on the growth paths of firms over time. Standard cross-sectional attribute measures and average growth rates are unable to convey the cumulative process of new firm growth. It was therefore necessary to collect and analyse new data for this purpose and to devise methods for representing this evidence. 9 Since standard descriptive statistical methods were unsuitable for our purpose we used a form of exploratory data analysis (EDA) which seeks to find patterns in data that are of empirical and conceptual interest (Tukey, 1977; Marsh, 1988) . In the empirical part of this paper we explore these issues by 9 The tracking of growth paths is proposed not as an alternative but as a supplement to approaches which measure variance. This exploratory inquiry could be a starting point for more analytic quantitative work, drawing for example on methodologies of demographers (cf. Van Wissen and Dykstra, 1999) and sociologists (cf. Abbott, 1995) in studies of personal career paths. 8 In their exhaustive overview of organizational growth studies, Weinzimmer et al. (1998) show that these studies are dominated by formulae using manipulations of first-year (t 0 ) and last-year (t f ) size to measure growth, either as absolute growth or as growth rate. They acknowledge that these studies ''ignore valuable information concerning the middle years of a study, and thus fail to capture the dynamic properties of growth. This may result in either weak models and/or misspecified results and interpretations'' (Weinzimmer et al., 1998: 238) . However, they leave the issue of growth processes aside in the rest of their article.
investigating the growth paths of several longitudinal samples of new firms. The Penrosean model provided guidance on causal factors and pointed to the kinds of patterns in growth paths to look for. 10 From the explanatory model of firm growth outlined above we draw measurable inferences about the extent, direction and discontinuities in firms' growth over time. Our data analysis was exploratory in that we had no prior conceptions as to how to recognize or represent evidence relevant to our dynamic model of new firm growth. We had to find new graphical methods to represent sequences of growth behaviour. We applied sequence analysis 11 in a novel way to uncover growth episodes and turning points during the early life course of new firms. For this purpose, the data points making up the growth paths are compressed and coded for a reduction in a growth indicator, for an increase, and for no change or negligible change. The resulting measures, examined below, were thus coded to represent key turning points in the firms' growth paths. Sequences such as ''plateau following growth'', ''growth following plateau'' and ''reversal following growth'' can be identified in the samples. The interval between turning points (inflections) is measured over time; the period between inflections is a growth episode. Growth inflections are not unique but recurrent, that is, a firm may face some turning points more than once in the course of its existence.
Measuring New Firm Growth
To represent and compare new firms' growth experience, it is necessary to conceptualize the growth of a new firm in ways that can be measured. According to Penrose (1995: 25) :
Ideally, the size of firm for our purposes should be measured with respect to the present value of the total of its resources (including its personnel) used for its own productive purposes. This is almost impossible to discover in practice, and in the absence of any really satisfactory measure of size we have a wide choice depending on our purpose.
Penrose was sceptical of measuring firm attributes that are unique to individual firms; these may not be ''reducible to any common denominator and are therefore incapable of quantitative treatment'' (Penrose, 1995: 199) . But she recognized the need to measure growth performance on some basis, for example, in terms of the growth of fixed assets (Penrose, 1995: 25) . Some such measures are needed for the purpose of comparing the growth experience of firms. Each of the following measures illustrates some feature of growth and each is subject to limitations as a growth indicator (cf. Delmar et al., 2003) . Input, output and value growth in 10 In contrast to the traditional research design, EDA need not start with a fully specified research problem since it involves an open-minded inductive approach, exploring what is to be found in the data, whether or not anticipated. This exploratory research generates questions that can be answered by analysing contrasting cases with regard to interesting features of the data, for example, why certain firms initially follow the same growth path but bifurcate after a certain moment in time. Unlike some investigators using EDA, we had interpretive guidance from our model. 11 Sequence analysis involves the temporal ordering of events, which mark the transitions of one phase state into another. The roots of sequence analysis can be traced back to the study of gene sequencing in biology, and has been applied to the study of the careers of persons (Abbott, 1995) . a firm may not be aligned, and so diverse growth measures should not be expected to correlate (see Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005) . A firm's growth can be measured in terms of inputs (investment funds, employees), in terms of the value of the firm (assets, market capitalization, economic value added) or outputs (sales revenues, profits).
N Many studies of new venture growth cite funds invested at various stages, but these track the ''burn rate'' of investment funds rather than the growth of productive resources.
N Sales figures (turnover) have to be adjusted for inflation, and are affected by vertical integration (how much of final sales is produced internally or bought in).
N Profits are in various ways to avoid tax liability or to raise the valuation of the firm, creating comparison problems.
N Employment figures are the most commonly used measure because they offer standardized, comparable data on the rate and direction in which a firm has been expanding. N Valuation of the firm's assets is a composite indicator of growth. This includes tangible assets, for example, productive equipment and buildings, and a valuation of intangible assets such as the firm's expertise and reputation. The valuation of the firm varies with investor sentiment over the business cycle. A battery of financial ratios is supplied for investors once firms become public.
N Other composite indicators of growth can be devised, and measures may be weighted.
Some indicators like Birch's take into account initial firm size when representing relative growth rates. The Birch Employment Growth Index (Birch, 1987) corrects for firm size by using the product of absolute growth and percentage growth.
Tracking growth measures over time (instead of taking average measures of growth rates and cross-sectional indicators of attributes) is a way of approaching growth in a diachronic way. It is clear that growth indicators reflect the outcomes of many different interacting causes that influence new firm growth paths. Before the relationships between cause and effect can be meaningfully explored, there is groundwork to be done on ways of representing firm growth without losing diachronic information that conveys the path of growth over time.
A firm's growth can be thought of as following one among multiple possible paths (Garnsey, 1998) . The actual path can be traced by a variety of growth measures at varying intervals. Slope and change in slope are the elemental components of a firm's growth path. It is axiomatic that at any point in time, metrics of firm size change will show the firm undergoing growth, stability or decline. Fluctuations may occur at any time and on any scale. As in other fractal phenomena, fluctuations give the appearance of being smoothed out when measures are taken at wider intervals. The series of intervals at which measures are taken along the x-axis determines how many of such fluctuations are captured in the data. The representation of growth paths also depends on measures used. We have chosen the standard indicator, namely, employment, which is the most comparable.
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Changes in employee size are a conservative measure for investigating the instability of growth, in comparison to more rapidly changing figures such as sales or capital valuation. In our analysis, employment growth has been used for the construction of growth episodes and the operational definition of turning points. We converted firms' growth over time from interval to nominal scales. These represented types of growth episodes experienced, according to rate of growth over that episode. A sequence of summarized growth episodes was used to depict turning points in growth paths.
Research Samples
Longitudinal samples of new firms which were diverse in some respects but shared enough common features to allow meaningful comparison were needed as a research base for the empirical investigation of early paths of growth over at least 5 years. We aimed to examine firms founded in the same place and year so that the firms in the sample would experience similar macro economic effects as they aged. We wanted to investigate the growth of a cohort of new firms drawn from a coherent population of firms. The group of firms investigated should not be in zero-sum competition for customers, that is, should have their own competitive niche. Technology-based firms founded in the Cambridge area met these criteria. Data on growth performance over a 10-year period were compiled for 237 firms founded in 1990. The inquiry was replicated and refined using a quota sample of 136 German technology-based firms surviving over 7 years from 1991/92 and a sample of 25 young fast-growing Netherlands firms surviving over at least 5 years from 1990 to 1995. The characteristics of the three research samples are summarized in Table 1 .
The data were compressed in two ways. First, interval scale data were reduced to nominal scale by converting employment level to direction of change from previous period. Data-points in the samples were coded for growth reduction greater than 5 per cent, for increase greater than 5 per cent and for change in either direction of less than 5 per cent. In a subsequent compression, the resulting measures were coded according to key turning points in evidence. Growth paths are categorized by dominant turning point(s), presented as archetypes in Figure 3 . In what follows propositions from the model of dynamic processes are examined in the light of evidence on growth paths.
New Firm Development Explored: Growth Paths
In this section we will apply the propositions that are drawn from the Penrosean model to the three research samples. New firms that experience little growth are less likely to build up reserves to tide them over the resource asynchronies experienced by most new firms. Because firms need a continuous inflow of resources in order to trade and survive, those that are not growing and expanding productive activity are particularly vulnerable to change. If their environment shifts, the revenues on which they depend for inputs are threatened. Figure 1 shows that firms that had grown less than the mean growth of firms in their sector were more likely to be closed. 13 This is consistent with Kirchhoff's findings for high-tech firms, that firms with a better growth record were more likely to survive (Kirchhoff, 1994: 184; see also Phillips and Kirchhoff, 1989; Cosh and Hughes, 2000) . Growth creates problems. Reynolds and White (1997: 122 and 215) found that in their large US new firm samples, ''firms with more (growth) potential reported more problems of every kind''. But the problems accompanying growth are less dangerous to a firm's survival than the absence of growth. 14 Our approach is particularly useful for inquiry into growth paths, as discussed under Propositions 2, 2a, 2b and 3 below. Delay, interruptions and surges of growth are likely in new firms as resource problems arise, are resolved and opportunities shift for resource constrained new firms. Dynamic processes of this kind are likely to result in variations in the timing, magnitude, duration and rate of change of growth as between firms and in the same firm over time. For example, difficulties Figure 1 . Growth and no-growth by age of firm, Cambridgeshire cohort 13 It is possible that in some firms the decision to lay off employees would have been planned and desired, for example, through the sale of a division. But firms would not have intended cutbacks that increased their vulnerability to closure. 14 Across all sectors, the well-endowed start-up and initial large team is less likely to lose impetus (Reynolds and White, 1997) . In technology-based ventures, large team start-ups are often the result of demergers or groups of people leaving earlier employment together in spin-outs. Where they have experience and access to a resource base this enables the ''new'' firm to achieve revenues early on. regarding the recognition of the ''productive opportunity'' and of building a productive base will result in differences in the onset of growth, with some new firms showing a slow start and growth picking up as the productive base becomes operational.
The growth paths of the firms demonstrated an uneven record. In Figure 2 , rate of growth is shown by slope, extent of growth by the scale used. Figure 2 illustrates growth discontinuities for several of the firms that survived over a 10-year period. They include variations in the timing of the onset of growth, interruptions in the form of growth plateaux and growth reversal. Sustained growth among the firms was rare. This relates to the findings in studies on growth rates of firms that found a systematic tendency for the variance in growth rates to be larger for small (and often young) firms than for large firms (Hymer and Pashigan, 1962; Amaral et al., 1997; Wilson and Morris, 2000) . This is a specification of Proposition 2. Dynamic processes provoke interruptions and setbacks. These discontinuities imply turning points marking changes in growth trajectories in terms of rate and duration. Summary measures, graphics and equations did not readily capture relevant information from growth path data of the kind illustrated in Figure 2 . Standard measures of growth rates lost the information we sought. For example, if we look at Figure 2 , cross-sectional measures could assign firms A and C to the same growth category if the age of 9 years is taken as the second time point, while a diachronic comparison of the growth paths with EDA would lead to assigning firms A and B to the same category. The same argument could be made in the lower graphic: if the age of 3 years is taken as a second time point, all three firms would be assigned to the same growth category, while we would classify firm E in another category, due to the setback it had faced in this period. If we take the age of 10 as an end point, cross-sectional approaches would assign firms E and F to the same growth category, while EDA shows that firm F was a slow but steady grower, and that firm E faced several setbacks over the whole period.
Proposition 2b. Early growth is liable to reversal.
The tendency for early growth that is interrupted to spiral into decline or reversal is a dynamic process discussed in the explanatory model. Figure 3 shows that in the Cambridge data-set, only 6 per cent of the surviving firms grew continuously over the 10 years, with The revenue growth record of a cohort of survivors in the German sample shows that only 4 per cent of the firms experienced continuous growth while 59 per cent experienced at least one episode of decline and 88 per cent experienced at least one episode of stagnation. Employment growth data produce a similar picture, with only 1 per cent of all firms having grown continuously, while 49 per cent experienced at least one period of decline. The firms making up the Netherlands sample revealed, as could be expected from a sample selected for growth record, a higher proportion than the other samples of continuous growth paths (36 per cent of the firms) and a much lower incidence of setbacks (only 16 per cent of the firms in the sample faced a setback during their early life course). This sample included only those that had at least 20 employees within the first 10 years. Even in this sample, 24 per cent of the firms experienced delayed growth and 24 per cent had an initial growth period followed by a plateau period.
There is evidence from other sources that rapid growth of new firms is hard to sustain. 15 In one study of fast growth firms, among the fastest 10 per cent of growth companies, one-fifth show a decline in performance within 4 years (Storey, 1997b: 6) . A more recent study analysing these ''Ten Percenters'' over a decade shows that the gazellelike growth behaviour of these firms is very fragile, as the average growth of these firms slowed dramatically after their initial fast growth period (Parker et al., 2005 ). An earlier study had cited ''empirical evidence which suggests that the financial structures and performances of high performers and failing firms are very similar'' (Keasey and Watson, 1993: 112) . The pressures of growth take a toll even of the most promising new ventures.
16
The advantages of early growth are internal (learning effects) as well as external (market position). The data from all three samples showed growth more likely to follow growth than to follow an episode of plateau or decline. This is consistent with other work showing that growth is more likely among growth firms (e.g. Wagner, 1992; Blanchflower and Burgess, 1996; Stanley et al., 1996; Cosh and Hughes, 2000) . The dynamic process approach 16 An analysis based on a large US data-set indicates that the chances of achieving high growth are greater among highly innovative (mainly high-tech) firms. But among these highly innovative firms, those that fail to grow sufficiently are more likely to close than those that achieve growth (Kirchhoff, 1994) . This implies that an innovative firm is more likely to find a promising resource base and market position, but that those firms in this group that fail to sustain growth are likely to run into difficulties leading to closure. We suggest that failure to sustain growth may not simply be the result of resource constraints (Kirchhoff, 1994) , but of growth at a rate too rapid to be sustained in relation to the resources available to the firm. Confirmation requires more detailed data like case study evidence that shows how this can occur.
explains why conditions for growth reinforcement are not created during stasis or decline phases; growth is more propitious for further growth unless resource constraints set in. In both the German and Cambridge samples the ''growth-growth'' formation, that is, a year of growth followed by another year of growth, was the most common sequence, representing 30 and 28 per cent of all two-period sequences in the samples. Expressed differently, around 60 per cent of sequences beginning with an incidence of growth were followed by a second period of growth, whereas only 36-39 per cent of sequences beginning with a plateau were followed by growth. In the German case 58 per cent of growth sequences were followed by another period of growth, compared with 59 per cent in the Cambridge cohort. The plateau-growth sequence was found in 36 per cent of the sequences in the German sample and 39 per cent in the sequences of the Cambridge cohort. In the Netherlands sample of successful firms the ''growth-growth'' formation was even more pronounced: 85 per cent of all two-period sequences. Even more of the sequences beginning with an incidence of growth were followed by a second period of growth (93 per cent), while only 52 per cent of sequences beginning with a plateau were followed by growth.
Concluding Remarks
A multi-level diachronic approach to new firm growth reveals dynamic processes at work as the new firms develop. This provides a theoretically grounded basis for interpreting case study evidence at the firm level. Detailed case studies of new firms can be carried out to explore the operation of dynamic processes of the kind set out above. We have shown that many of the dynamic processes that Penrose identified in mature growing firms can be seen to occur in new firms and to shape their development experience. 17 One of the problems of case analysis is the difficulty of making systematic comparisons. The methods we propose provide a way of comparing the growth paths of new firms and identifying key differences calling for explanation from case evidence. Moreover, instead of the disjuncture often found in the literature between research on development processes in the individual firm and generalizations about growth rates in populations of new firms, analysis at the two levels can be mutually supportive. The conceptual scheme proposed makes sense of the non-linearities we have discovered in the growth paths of new firms illustrated by three longitudinal samples of new firms. Standard cross-sectional attribute/performance correlations and average growth rates fail to capture important features of the course of growth in firms. The exploratory analysis has shown that there are recurring patterns in the growth of new firms associated with typical developmental experience.
Further Work
Implications of the model and empirical findings reported here indicate the need to reconsider issues that were disregarded during the recent period when ''success attributes'' 17 The proposed approach is most fruitful for the analysis of relatively young firms in industries where there is enough ''space'' to grow without having to compete severely with incumbents; that is, the processes of opportunity identification and resource mobilization are more relevant than the process of value capture.
were widely regarded as granting certain new firms the potential for sustained rapid growth. The model of new firm development presented here explains why it is to be expected that ventures that achieve early rapid growth often run into resource shortage and other growthinduced problems, while other firms that overcome their difficulties move onto an improved growth trajectory. Aggregate effects are likely to be regression to the mean: … a firm that grew more than (or less than) the industry growth rate in the previous period … on the average tends to grow more than (or less than) the industry growth rate in the current period but at a closer rate to the industry growth rate than in the previous period … ( Ijiri and Simon, 1967: 350) However, it does not follow that growth is the result of chance factors (Geroski, 2000) or the inexplicable outcome of ''random shocks leading to some fast-growth firms, but without any consistent factors 'explaining' their growth'' (Storey, 1997a: 119) . New firm growth is not indeterminate but, like other complex dynamic processes, the outcome of systemic feedback mechanisms, the effects of which may be mistaken for randomness when statistical methods are used that cannot capture the subtleties of causal feedback (cf. Hugo and Garnsey, 2005) . Further detailed studies are needed to explore the way entrepreneurs and managers respond to endogenous and exogenous developments; these determine which firms recover and which ones experience reversal among firms that, taken together, experience regression to mean growth rates over time.
